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THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE
SUPREME COURT-OLD WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE?
MANLY FLEISCHMANN*

O

I.

AND RONALD

H.

JENSEN**

INTRODUCTION

N July 27, 1970, the American Bar Assocation announced
that Attorney General John N. Mitchell had agreed to an
important change in- the procedure which he had previously followed in the selection of persons to be recommended to the President as nominees for the United States Supreme Court.' Until
the announcement, there had been, during the present administration, no consultation of any kind with respect to selection of
Supreme Court Justices between the Justice Department or the
President on the one hand, and the American Bar Association or
any other bar association, on the other.
The Attorney General stated that in the future he would
submit the names of persons under consideration for appointment to the high court to the ABA's Committee on the Federal
Judiciary, since he had concluded that it would be "useful"
for the Committee to report to him on a possible court nominee
before he made a recommendation to Mr. Nixon.
The Chairman of the ABA Committee on the Federal Judiciary, former Federal Judge Lawrence E. Walsh, accepted the
new assignment for his Committee with obvious enthusiasm,
hailing the arrangement as "the most important innovation in
the procedure for selecting Supreme Court nominees which any
recent Attorney General has undertaken." 2
It will come as no surprise to seasoned Washington-watchers
that the new plan announced by Attorney General Mitchell did
not meet with unanimous approval, even on the part of the nation's lawyers. One of the first to level rhetorical guns at the new
arrangement was a longtime critic of the present and previous
* Member, New York, District of Columbia, and United States Supreme Court Bars.
A.B., Harvard University, 1929; LL.B., University of Buffalo, 1933.
.
Member, New York Bar..B.A., Yale University, 1961; LL.B., Harvard University.
1964.
1. Press release of Lawrence E. Walsh, Chairman of the Standing Committee on
Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Association, July 27, 1970.
2. Letter from Lawrence E. Walsh to John N. Mitchell, July 27, 1970, in reply to
2
letter from John N. Mitchell to Bernard G. Segal and Lawrence.E. Walsh, July. 23, 1970.
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Republican administrations and also of the ABA. This was Vice
Chairman Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., of the Americans for Democratic Action. With the occasional hyperbole which marks Mr.
Rauh's public utterances, he referred to the new clearance arrangement as "weak-kneed capitulation to one of the most reactionary forces in America."
Mr. Rauh continued:
Instead of broadening the jurisdiction of the American Bar Association, he [the President] should exclude it from the judge-selection
process entirely, .... After all, the American Bar Association cleared
both Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell for their lower
court appointments and kept clearing them for the Supreme Court
even after the worst was known. 3
On the other hand, Judge Walsh's satisfaction with the new
understanding was predictable. In a report made by his Committee to Bernard G. Segal, President of the ABA, on May 13,
1970, it had been specifically recommended that "the Attorney
General should be requested to give the profession an adequate opportunity to comment on a prospective nominee before the nomination is announced." '4 Thus, an article in the New York Times
(July 28, 1970) was headlined "Mitchell Yields On Court
Choices" and went on to state correctly that "the decision represented a complete turnabout for the Nixon Administration.",,
None of the President's first four selections had been submitted
by the Administration to the ABA for clearance in advance of
nomination.
Early editorial comment on the prospective clearance procedure was generally favorable, though later comment has raised
questions as to its efficacy.6 As will be discussed later, there is no
reason to believe that the clearance procedure now envisioned
can insure its objective, which we assume is to bring about appointments from the ranks of those having the highest qualifications of mind, character and achievement, while making certain
the elimination of those who, by the application of similar high
3. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1970, at 23, col. 1.
4. Report of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal judiciary
to the Board of Governors, at 23 (May 13, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Report of the ABA
Committee on FederalJudiciary].
5. N.Y. Times, supra note 3, at 1, col. 5.
6. Oelsner, A Plan for Avoiding 'More Haynsworths,' N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1970, §4,
at 9, cols. 7-8; TIME, Aug. 10, 1970, at 43.
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standards, would be considered unfit for the high court. Nonetheless, we conclude that the new arrangement will contribute to
that objective and will be more effective than the procedure it
replaces.
In any event, the action of the Attorney General culminated
many months of heated public debate concerning the proper role
of the President, the Attorney General, the Senate, interested
groups (including bar associations) and individuals in the nomination and confirmation process; the debate waxed and waned
during the successive nominations of Judges Haynsworth, Carswell and Blackmun. During the same period an equally important, but less publicized controversy arose as to the matters to be
considered by any bar association in rating nominees for the Supreme Court. The ABA adhered to its traditional view that it
would take into account only the professional qualifications of
the nominee-"integrity, judicial temperament and professional
competence. ' '7 A different view was espoused by the nationally
prestigious Bar Association of the City of New York which we will
refer to as The City Bar. A subcommittee of its governing Executive Committee recommended on April 30, 1970, that the ABA
should expand its investigation "to include a review of the nominee's social and economic philosophy .... ,,s This report was
adopted by the full Executive Committee on May 6, 1970,
though not unanimouslyf
Preparation of this article was commenced shortly after the
emergence of this difference of opinion between the ABA and
the City Bar. We believed this to be a sufficiently important issue
to deserve a thorough review, particularly because of a paucity of
legal commentary on the subject. Our major attention is still
directed to that issue, but the recent action of the Attorney General necessarily requires some expansion of the scope of this inquiry.
We confine this study to the matter of selection of Supreme
Court Justices because that Court, as many others have pointed
out, is in fact unique in the frequency and importance of the
7. Report of the ABA Committee on FederalJudiciary, at 16.
8. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Sub-Committee on

Nominations for the Supreme Court of the United States, at 3 (Apr. 30, 1970).
9. It should be noted that one of the present writers was a member of the Executive
Committee at that time; he voted against that part of the report of the sub-committee

just referred to.
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constitutional, political, social, moral and economic problems
which come before it. Such questions arise in lower federal courts
and state courts too, but not with the same urgency and not with
the same consequences for the American public. We do not intimate that distinguished legal ability should not be a prerequisite
to appointment to the Court-quite the contrary-but only that
a consideration of other qualifications may be of equal importance as a basis for selection of great judges for this great tribunal.
II.

SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: HISTORICAL SUMMARY

"All that's past is prologue." That is certainly true of the
new clearance procedure about to be embarked upon. What is
different in the proposed arrangement is not the substance of the
planned review, but its official sanction and the consequent public scrutiny which will now more than ever be leveled at ABA's
deliberations in this field. The history of ABA's activity with
respect to Supreme Court appointments is meager, but in its
course some cautionary signals appear. These alone would justify
a recital of that history; in Santayana's words, "those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it."'1 For similar
reasons, we shall refer in a subsequent section (infra III) to examples of activities of groups of lawyers not officially organized
into associations, but put together to influence judicial selection,
or in some cases judicial determinations or legislative action,
and, by design or otherwise, publicizing the relationship of
members of their group with organized bar associations.
The ABA from the time of its organization was naturally and
intensely interested in the process by which judges were selected,
both at the state and federal levels. Nevertheless, "the activities
of the American Bar Association in the area of judicial selection
prior to 1946 fluctuated from intense effort and participation to
passive comment. Its initial efforts consisted mainly of exhorting
state and local bar groups to take a more active part in the selection process at their own levels."" Thus, the Bar Association
took no official position with respect to the then controversial

.-

10. G.

SANTAYANA.

11. J.

GROSSMAN,

THE LIFE OF R soN 284 (1905).
LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA
SELECTION 52 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GROSSMAN].
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nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to the Supreme Court in 1916,
as it did not then have any formal mechanism to evaluate candidates for the federal bench.12 At the same time, many distinguished lawyers who were past and present officers of the ABA
became deeply involved in the controversy that raged over his
confirmation (infra III).
Herbert Hoover's Attorney General, William D. Mitchell,
was himself a lawyer of great distinction and the ABA was much
encouraged by his public statement that an "overwhelming sentiment by the Bar for or against a particular man makes a deep
impression upon the public mind, upon the Senators especially
interested, and on the appointing power"-this because of the
"realization that a lawyer's qualities are most clearly discerned
by the members of his own profession."' 3 Shortly thereafter, in
1930, lawyers were generally disturbed by the Senate's rejection
of the nomination of Judge John Parker of North Carolina to the
Supreme Court; it was widely believed that a principal reason
for the rejection of this distinguished judge was the opposition of
4
organized labor.'
Spurred into activity by this and other considerations, the
ABA in 1932 established a Special Committee on federal appointments whose specific function was -to advise the Senate Judiciary
Committee. It-had a short and uneventful life until the advent of
the Roosevelt Administration in 1933. Thereafter, the "Committee's services were never once requested by either the new
Attorney General or Senate Judiciary Committee, and at its own
request the Committee was discontinued in 1934."15

There followed a twelve year period of dolce far niente for
the ABA in the field of judicial selection. It next became actively
and officially involved in the appointment of federal judges in
1946, when its House of Delegates established a Special Committee on the Judiciary, later renamed the Standing Committee
on Federal Judiciary. 6 The Committee was able to develop good
12. rd. at 54-55.
13. Appointment of FederalJudges, 17 A.B.A.J. 572 (1931).
14. Labor was incensed at Judge Parker's decision in United Mine Workers v. Red
Jacket Consolidated Coal and Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927), which had affirmed
a district court's order enjoining, under the authority of the Sherman Act, the United
Mine Workers from engaging in certain organizational activities, including the inducement
of employees to violate their "yellow dog" contracts.
15. GROSSMAN, at 58.
16. Id. at 60-62.
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liaison with the Senate Judiciary Committee, possibly because
Republican victories in 1946 had elevated Senator Alexander
Wiley of Wisconsin to the chairmanship of that Committee.
Wiley announced that so long as he was chairman "full weight
will be given to the recommendation of recognized legal groups
which have not been accorded the weight and respect which are
their just due."' 7 However, despite the good rapport with the
Senate Judiciary Committee, the ABA Committee had difficulty
establishing a working relationship with the Justice Department.
President Truman characteristically stated that "he had appointed plenty of good judges opposed by the bar associations"
and that such opposition did not upset him. It would be fair to
say that he was glad to have bar association approval of judicial
appointments, but he made it clear that the failure to receive
such approval would not deter him from making any appointment.18 Despite this dim view from the command post, a significant advance was in fact made during the last six months of the
Truman Administration. An arrangement was worked out between Deputy Attorney General Ross Malone and the ABA, with
the cooperation of Attorney General James McGranery, whereby
all persons under serious consideration for appointment as federal
judges were to have their names submitted to the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary for a report on their professional
qualifications. This agreement was in fact never put into operation during the balance of President Truman's term because the
administration decided not to make any interim appointments.'
President Eisenhower's appointees, Attorney General Herbert Brownell and Deputy Attorney General William Rogers,
agreed to continue the arrangement worked out by Malone, except that they requested the Committee not to suggest any names
but to limit its evaluation to candidates submitted to it by the
Attorney General. ° Moreover, it was made clear at an early date
that this procedure would not extend to appointments to the
Supreme Court. When Chief Justice Vinson died, the Committee
offered its services to the Attorney General. The Administration,
17. Quoted in Report of the Special Committee on Judiciary, 72 A.B.A. REP. 411
(1947).
18. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1951, at 23, col. 5.
19. See Fox, The Selection of Federal Judges: The Work of the Federal Judiciary,
Committee, 43 A.B.A.J. 685, 686 (1957); GROSSMAN, at 70-71.
20. Fox, supra note 19, at 686; GROSSMAN, at 71.
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however, declined the offer on the ground that appointment of a
Supreme Court Justice was a personal appointment of the President. The Committee was not consulted on the next appointment either, but its chairman was later invited by Deputy Attorney General Rogers to testify before the Senate Committee in
favor of the Administration's nominee, Judge Harlan. 1
An interesting anecdote is related concerning the appointment 6f Justice Brennan. President Eisenhower asked what the
ABA Committee on the Federal Judiciary thought about him.
When he was told that the Committee had not been asked for its
opinion, he directed that the nomination be held up until the
Committee could report. For the duration of the Eisenhower
Administration, the names of all prospective nominees to the Supreme Court (as well as to the inferior federal courts) were submitted to the ABA Committee for investigation prior to being
made public.2 The practice was largely ritualistic, however,
with respect to Supreme Court nominees, by reason of the fact
that the Committee was given only about 24 hours notice of the
name of the nominee; during that period the Committee was apparently expected to make its investigation and report to the
Attorney General on the nominee's professional qualification.
Fortunately for the Committee, history records no breakdown
of the long distance telephone system during the operation of this
type of clearance such as the nation has recently undergone.
This just-better-than-nothing arrangement worked out in the
Eisenhower Administration continued through the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.
President Nixon departed from the practice of his predecessors and decided not to consult the Committee in advance of Supreme Court nominations. No names of such nominees have ever
been submitted to the Committee by the present Administration.
Thus, the ABA investigations undertaken in connection with the
nominations of Judges Burger, Haynsworth, Carswell and Blackmun were not requested by the President or the Attorney General but rather by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary.2 3
21.
22.
23.

Fox, supra note 19, at 688, 761.
Id.
Walsh, Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 56 A.B.A.J. 555, 556 (1970).
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III.

GAMES LAWYERS PLAY

The activity of lawyers with respect to the selection of judicial officers, including justices of the Supreme Court, has by no
means been confined to organized bar associations. As we have
pointed out, bar association intervention is a relatively new development, largely because bar associations generally lacked any
apparatus for formulating and presenting their views to the appointing or confirming authority. However, individual lawyers,
and lawyers grouped together for one or more specific purposes,
have taken part in the judicial selection process and in comparable activities at the federal level on more than one occasion.
It has become somewhat characteristic of such efforts that the participants, whether they intend to or not, give the impression
that they are really speaking for the American Bar Association or
for other leading bar associations, even though no official action
to authorize such intervention has ever been taken. For this reason we find it convenient to refer to groups organized in this manner as "quasi-bar associations."
The first example in recent years of this type of activity occurred in 1916 in connection with the nomination of Louis D.
Brandeis to the Supreme Court.24 Brandeis had, attained national
reputation because of his work as the "people's lawyer"' :in Boston. While, according to Walter Lippman, the opposition at 'the
outset came from "the powerful but limited community which
dominated the business
and social life of Boston," the controversy
soon expanded . 5 By the time of the hearing there was produced
in opposition to the nomination a memorial signed by seven former presidents of the ABA, including former President Taft, who
described the nomination as "a fearful shock . . . [I] t is one of
the deepest wounds that I have had as an American and a lover
of the Constitution and a believer in progressive conservatism
that such a man as Brandeis would be put on the Court. He is a
muckraker, an emotionalist for his own purposes, a socialist." 2
Apparently, no opponent of the nomination ever seriously
attempted to demonstrate lack of professional competence, since
24. A full account of the matter can be found in J. HARIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT OF
(1953).

THE SENATE

25.
26.

Id. at 100.
Id. at 102.
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Brandeis was certainly one of the ablest lawyers in the country.
The former presidents of the ABA contented themselves with
a blank condemnation in the following language:
To the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: The undersigned feel
under the painful duty to say to you that in their opinion, taking into
view the reputation, character and professional career of Mr. Louis
D. Brandeis, he is not a fit person to be a member of the Supreme Court
of the United States.27
An attempt was made during the course of the hearings to demonstrate that Brandeis had at some time been guilty of unprofessional conduct. The Senate subcommittee examined these
charges and found that Brandeis' conduct had been not only ethical and correct, but indeed it was indicated that he had extraordinarily high professional standards.2
With the question of professional competence never at issue
and the question of integrity eliminated, the debate at the hearings and in the press appeared in its true light, namely, a protest
by a small group of conservatively oriented leaders of the ABA
against the appointment of a liberal who had spent his professional career championing the rights of the people against the
entrenched wealth and economic power of the leaders of the Boston community.
Unbelievable as it may seem, the ethnic issue was raised both
for and against the appointment. Jewish supporters of Brandeis
claimed that much of the opposition arose because of his race.
Opponents of Brandeis took just the opposite position. For example, Senator Lodge wrote Taft as follows:
As you say, there has not been the slightest opposition to him because
of his race. That has been brought forward only by those who favor
him.2 9

We cite this example as indicating some of the perils of opposition to a judicial appointment based solely on the supposed
economic and social views of the candidate. The Brandeis episode
is generally regarded as one of the low points in the history of
27. Hearings on the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis Before the Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., I, at 1226 (1916).
28. J. HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 113 (1958).
29. A. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 182 (1964).
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the involvement of the ABA with judicial appointments, even
though no official action was ever taken by it. It has been pointed
out that the seven former presidents in all probability accurately
reflected the views of the membership:
That the opposition of the A.B.A. to Brandeis did not come
through 'channels,' but was articulated as the personal views of seven
former presidents, should not be interpreted as something less than
the accurate views of the then small membership of the A.B.A. At that
stage in its development it was still primarily a closely knit group of
successful lawyers whose views probably coincided with those expressed
by the seven presidents. Yet the near success that the campaign against
Brandeis had could be attributed in part to the personal prestige of
the seven presidents, and their ability to mobilize other forces in support of their case. The A.B.A. had not yet developed any formal mechanism for the scrutiny of the federal judicial selection process.80
Even Taft later appears to have modified his views about
the Brandeis appointment. During the period when they served
together on the Supreme Court their relations were quite
friendly although they continued their differences on social and
economic questions and were often on opposite sides. However,
Taft once said of Brandeis:
He brought to us all sorts of information as to economic conditions
and other matters of the greatest value which we did not have before
and would never have acquired otherwise.3 1
During the period of the New Deal, groups of conservative
lawyers were organized more than once for similar purposes. The
American Liberty League was founded in 1934 by wealthy businessmen and immediately became the spokesman for the opposition to the New Deal. One of the most active groups organized

by it was the "National Lawyers Committee" consisting of approximately 58 members, all leading corporate lawyers. Wide

publicity was given to the fact that 55 of the 58 members were
also members of the ABA. Included were three past presidents
and also, as it turned out, three future presidents, nine members

of the ABA's first House of Delegates, seven members of the Executive Committee, etc. The task of the Committee was to draw up
and publicize "briefs" on the constitutionality of various New
55.

30.

GRoSSMAN, at

31.

A. MASON, BRANDEIS:

A FREE MAN'S LiFE 629 (1956).
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Deal proposals, carefully claiming that it did not attempt to judge
the economic merits of the legislation. It did not come as a shock
to observers of the effort when the Committee solemnly opined
that every piece of New Deal legislation that it investigated was
unconstitutional-nor when the Supreme Court subsequently up22
held most of them.
These activities identified the ABA so closely with the
enemies of the New Deal, liberalism and social progress that it
developed a series of internal and public relations problems. In
1937 some of the more liberal members of the Association resigned and organized the National Lawyers Guild. The Guild
was not important as a political force for very long, and when
the ABA adopted a policy of non-alignment on political issues
during the second World War, the Guild in effect passed from
the national scene.
By 1938 more liberal leaders began to appear in the ABA.
In particular during the presidency of Arthur T. Vanderbilt
(1938), the Association dropped its preoccupation with political
issues. Judge John Parker summarized Vanderbilt's attitude as
follows:
He saw that the Association had been losing prestige by engaging in
controversies over economic and political matters and that its real field
of usefulness lay in bringing the administration of justice abreast of
3
modern conditions. 3

The most recent incident of the same kind shows that
"quasi-bar associations" can be organized as readily for "liberal"
as for "reactionary" purposes. During the Carswell confirmation
hearings, certain leading New York lawyers became convinced
that what they considered the pro-segregationist views of Judge
Carswell required his defeat. A group of 458 practicing lawyers
and legal educators, including many past and present, officers of
bar associations, was organized to cQmbat the nomination. Many
of the lawyers who signed the letter of protest

34

identified them-

selves in terms of the offices now or previously held in leading bar
32. See B. BROccKmAN, THE PoLmncs OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssoC-AnON 112 (1963).
See also A. SCHILESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF Tm NEW DEAL 488 (1958); National Lawyers
Committee of the American Liberty League, Report on the Constitutionality of the Na-

tional Labor Relations Act (Sept. 1935).
33. Quoted in B. BROCKMAN, supranote 32, at 116.
34. Letter of Bruce Bromley, Francis T. P. Plimpton, Samuel 1. Rosenman, Bethue)
M. Webster, et al., printed in 116 CONG. REG. 1607-08 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1970).
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associations; this at the request of the organizing group. Thus, under the name "Francis T. P. Plimpton" appeared the following:
"President, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York;"
Samuel I. Rosenman is described as "Former President, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York" and so on. As a
footnote to the descriptions, the following somewhat disingenuous statement appeared:
The mention of an organization is purely for descriptive purposes, and
not to indicate an expression of the views of the organization.
It should be added that the negative portion of the statement was true when made, since very few bar associations had at
that time taken a position in opposition to the nomination.
Shortly thereafter, several bar associations did take such official
action, including the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York,"m the Bar Association of San Francisco"' and the Philadelphia Bar Association. 37 We suppose, however, that prior to the
official action of these groups, a member of one of the designated
associations who happened to support the nomination of Judge
Carswell would have a justifiable complaint against the inferred
opposition of his organization without official action having been
taken on the subject.3
When a group is organized for the avowed purpose of presenting one side of a case, any thoughts of soliciting membership
from those holding an opposite view disappears, and the opinion
expressed can hardly be considered an impartial or representative
appraisal of legal opinion. Opposition of this group to the Carswell nomination was avowedly based primarily on the Judge's
supposed racist views. The following excerpt from a press conference held by Judge Samuel I. Rosenman (the moving spirit in
this enterprise) is instructive in this respect:
Judge Rosenman, a former New York Supreme Court justice,
acknowledged that the drive to solicit signatures to the anti-Carswell
statement had been hurried after it was suggested in a telephone
call to him by Irving M. Engel, also a New York attorney.
35. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1970, at 22, col. 5.
36. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1970, at 20, col. 6.
37. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1970, at 20, col. 6.
38. It should be confessed that one of the writers was also 'one of the signers of this
letter, identifying himself as a member of the Executive Committee of a particular bar
isociation. With the virtue of hindsight, he now believes the identification of the group
with bar associations to have been a mittake.

ABA AND THE SUPREME COURT

He said the statement had been sent to firms listed in the Bar
Register and restricted to those in cities with populations of more than
100,000 'except in the South.'
'Why was the South excluded?' a reporter asked.
'Frankly, we didn't want to waste the postage,' Judge Rosenman
replied. 'We thought there would be Southern prejudice. But we will
welcome with open arms any who will join us.'
'What about Northern prejudice the other way?' asked another
reporter.
'I thought we would get a fair representation from the North,'

Judge Rosenman said.3 9

IV. A CHOICE BETWEEN CONFLICTING VIEWS
The question of the proper role of the ABA in the selection
of Supreme Court justices, as has been discussed, is indeed controversial. At one extreme is the view taken by the Vice Chairman of the Americans for Democratic Action and shared by many
responsible lawyers, that the ABA by its nature should have no
role at all. At the other extreme is the position taken by the City
Bar that the ABA should specifically include in its review of a
nominee's qualifications a consideration of his social and economic views. A middle course is represented by the traditional
and current view of theABA that its only proper role is that of
advisor as to professional qualifications. In this section we will
state and analyze each of: these positions and indicate our reasons for preferring the ABA view. In our concluding section we
will make suggestions for improving the role of the ABA which
we think worthy of consideraition.
A. Thunder on the Left: the Position
that the ABA Has No ProperRole
A view shared by veterans of the National Lawyers Guild
and a substantial number of law professors throughout the country is essentially that an appraisal by any bar association, and particularly by the ABA, ought to be entirely eliminated; this
because such an appraisal is at best superficial and not representative of practicing lawyers as a whole, and at worst is a usurpation

of a public function by an irresponsible private group inherently
prejudiced and reactionary. In addition to the fiery denunciation
89. 163 N.Y.J. I (Mar. 13, 1970).
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'by the Vice Chairman of the A.D.A. quoted at the opening of
'this article, a more temperate statement of this position is that
of Professor Schmidhauser:
The realistic possibility that the leaders of the bar may attempt
in the future to enforce their private brand of ideological conformity
under the guise of selecting 'good' judges and justices respresents but
one aspect of the problem, for any shift, whether formal or informal,
of the authority to select judicial personnel from publicly responsible
-officials.-to, a private group such as the American Bar Association involves additional dangers. First, the control of judicial selection within
the private group very likely would fall into the hands of an active
minority, Consequently, in the long run, an elite within an already
politically irresponsible private group could determine the ideological
prerequisites of membership in the Supreme Court and inferior federal courts. Secondly, the procedures by which candidates for judicial
posts would be screened might, since they would be adopted outside
the arena of public control and scrutiny, be manifestly unfair or
prone to abuses of various kinds.
Concerning the first possibility, it has become virtually a tradition
of the American Bar Association that its leaders comprise those who
achieved high economic success in the profession and who entertained
deeply conservative viewpoints on economic and social questions.
These leaders manage the affairs of the Association and set the tone
and temper of its activities. 40

In like vein, Father Drinan, S.J., Dean of the Boston College
Law School, has written as follows:
The second suggestion that has been made by which the selection
of judges can allegedly be improved is to obtain recommendations
from Bar Associations. President Eisenhower is quoted as stating: 'We
must never appoint a man who doesn't have the recognition of the
American Bar Association.' Again the idea is appealing until its implications are analyzed.
1. If all nominees to important judgeships needed clearance from
the American Bar Association, would not this system in the long run
tend to favor only those appointees who happened to agree with the
rather conservative positions taken by the American Bar Association
-a private organization which enrolls as members less than one-third
of our 240,000 lawyers?
40.

J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SuPREME CouT

DURES 19 (1961).
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2. Does a private organization whose officials tend to be middleaged successful attorneys possess such special wisdom that it should
be able to veto the appointment of a man by presumably a simple
majority vote of a small committee?
One cannot forget when treating of this matter that seven past
presidents of the American Bar Association testified against the ap41
pointment of Justice Brandeis to the nation's highest tribunall
If we examine these objections closely, they seem to be basically devoid of merit, not because the past and proposed review
by the ABA is ideal, but because, quite simply, it is surely better
than no review at all. We state below the various justifications
advanced for the view that no appraisal by the ABA is in the
public interest, and our view of the merits of each point:
1. It is urged to be wrong in theory and in practice for a
public official having an important appointive power to delegate
any control over that power to an undemocratic private organization. Answer: It is perfectly clear that the limited arrangement between the Attorney General and the ABA, like its earlier
version, does not confer any appointive or veto power upon the
ABA at all. Any question on this subject is eliminated by the
specific understanding that the Attorney General will not consider any individuals suggested by the ABA. The function of the
latter is simply to comment on the "professional qualifications"
of nominees designated by the Attorney General. This type of
advice has a long and successful history in our Government.
In the present case it rests on the self-evident proposition
that lawyers are better able to appraise the professional qualifications of other lawyers than are laymen. This is a principle
applied throughout the professions and in nearly every other
walk of life. For example, during World Wars I and II and the
Korean War, industrial advisory committees were regularly assembled to express industry's viewpoints on important matters of
government policy, including appointments. 42 Such committees
were never given the appointing power nor any veto. It is generally believed that the results of this government-industry exchange were beneficial.
41. Drinan, How Not to Select Judges, 98 AmmIcA 683 (1958).
42. See O'Brian and Fleischmann, The War ProductionBoard, Administrative Policies
and Procedures,13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 38 (1944).
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2.
t is 'pointed out that the actual advice to be obtained
comes not from the membership of the ABA as a whole, but
rather from an "elite within an already politically irresponsible
private group." 43 Answer: It is true that the opinion in every case
is solely that, of the Committee on the Federal Judiciary. However, this is a familiar and inescapable aspect of representative
government. It is obviously not possible to poll the entire membership of the ABA, particularly since the confidential nature of
the inquiry ought to be preserved as long as possible. The membership of the Committee on the Federal Judiciary may well be
confined to successful lawyers, but it is rotated on occasion, is
diversified geographically and, in fact, represents more than one
shade of philosophical and experienced opinion. Until a better
method is suggested, the delegation within the ABA of this important function to a small carefully chosen group seems the only
feasible way to carry out the assignment.
3. The basic objections of all of those whose views have been
quoted and of many others who have taken the same position, is
that the American Bar Association is not representative of lawyers generally and, in fact, represents only the views of its leaders
who comprise "those who achieve high economic success in the
profession and who entertain deeply conservative viewpoints on
economic and social questions." 44 Answer: Assuming that this
were true at one time, it is no longer an accurate statement of the
present situation. Beginning with the term of President Vanderbilt, the general position of the ABA went through a substantial
reorientation. It is doubtless true that the leadership is drawn
from the ranks of successful lawyers who perhaps share some of
the economic views of their wealthy clients. On the other hand,
generalizations of this kind simply are no longer true with respect to the whole membership, as a reference to the Rosenman
letter (supra III) will demonstrate. Here was a transmission from
hundreds of individuals who can only be described as leaders of
the bar and the law faculties of the country. Included within the
roster were scores of lawyers who held or had held high positions
in the ABA and in powerful local associations. Whatever may have
been their economic views, their social views, as evidenced by the
communication itself, were certainly not conservative at all.
43. J. SCHmIDHAUSER, supra note 40, at 19.
44. Id.
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Again, it is highly significant that all of the nominations for the
Supreme Court made by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and
Johnson were approved by the ABA, although most of them would
have to be classified as liberal rather than conservative.
Finally on this point, we need to be continually reminded
the
choice here is between having the views of the only active
that
national association of lawyers or none at all, since the National
Lawyers Guild is no longer operative. So viewed, the preferable
course seems to be to welcome the advice of ABA's Committee
without an understanding of any kind that it will necessarily be
accepted.
B.

Right On! The City Bar's Call for a Consideration
of Economic and Social Views
Ironically, the Haynsworth-Carswell affairs produced two
radically different reactions concerning the proper role of the
ABA. There was, as we have seen, the position taken by Mr. Rauh
that the ABA should be excluded "from the judge selection process entirely. '45 But the prevalent reaction appeared to be just
the opposite-that the failing of the ABA had not been that it
was overly involved in the selection process, but that it was not
sufficiently aggressive in trying to secure the appointment and
confirmation of good candidates (and conversely the rejection
of bad candidates). Among those urging a more "activist" role
upon the ABA was the Bar Association of the City of New York.
A subcommittee of the City Bar recommended, among other reforms, that the Committee on the Federal Judiciary "expand its
investigation of all nominees for the Supreme Court to include a
review of the nominee's social and economic philosophy."4 This
recommendation, along with the others made by-the subcommittee, was subsequently adopted by the Executive Committee of the
City Bar. However, the ABA declined this invitation to expand its
jurisdiction. In rejecting this recommendation, the ABA used different words: "We, nevertheless, have concluded that, as in the
past, the Committee should endeavor to avoid considerations of
these factors [i.e., political and ideological factors] except as those
factors might affect judicial temperament." 47
45. N.Y. Times, supranote 3.
46. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Sub-Committee
on Nominations for the Supreme Court of the United States, at 3 (Apr. 30, 1970).
47. Report of the ABA Committee on FederalJudiciary, at 17.
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We thus have a controversy where the issue is not precisely
joined. The City Bar advocates that the nominee's "social and
economic philosophy" should be reviewed, while the ABA says
that it will avoid consideration of "political and ideological factors" except as these factors might affect judicial temperament.
A great difficulty about analyzing the proposal of the City
Bar is that there is no internal evidence in its report to assist in
determining, first, what is meant by "social and economic philosophy" or, second, what weight is intended to be given such factors
in passing upon the qualification of Supreme Court Justices.
However, some light is thrown on the subject by the fact that the
report was made in the midst of and in order to influence the debate on the confirmation of Judge Carswell. It is clear that by
social philosophy, the City Bar intends as a minimum to comprehend the type of racist views attributed to the nominee. We
assume that social philosophy would also include such matters as
views on civil rights. We hazard the guess that in selecting the
term, the Subcommittee had in mind approximately the same
,"political and ideological factors" referred to by the ABA.
What is meant by "economic philosophy" is much less dear.
We find it hard to believe that those who voted for inclusion of
this factor really intended to review what the nominee might believe about our present economic system including such controversial subjects as fiscal and monetary policy, distribution of
wealth, taxing methods and the like, although all of these matters
are dearly matters of economic philosophy. We do not suppose
that it would be seriously contended that a nominee who happens
to be a "single taxer" in the Henry George tradition should
thereby be considered qualified (or disqualified) for appointment
to the Supreme Court.
The difficulty of understanding such terms is further compounded by the failure of the City Bar to state what effect or
weight is to be given such views when they are established. They
are to be included in the "review" and obviously, unless the recommendation is meaningless, this conveys the impression that on
occasion the holding of such views might act as a disqualification
or even as a particular qualification, depending on the views of
the person applying such amorphous standards. We think it too
clear to require extended argument that such language lacks the
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precision which ought to be found in a charter for the ABA or any

other association engaged in such a delicate activity.
What can be said in support of the proposal?
By reason of the unique role of the Supreme Court, it is true
that the political, social and economic views of a Supreme Court
Justice may influence his decision in the vital controversies which
come before him more than his legal ability and judicial temperament in the conventional sense. This being true, it might also be
urged that a failure to appraise these factors renders a recommendation such as is contemplated by the ABA incomplete and on
occasion misleading. In support of this position, it can also be argued that such views, when known, inevitably affect the ultimate
recommendation in many cases, consciously or otherwise. Even
the ABA concedes that this is sometimes so when it says that political and ideological factors inay be considered when they
"might affect judicial temperament." 48
In our opinion, however, the ABA should be extremely hesitant to become involved in a general evaluation of the candidate's
ideological position. We recognize, as does the ABA, that there
are certain situations in which a consideration of the candidate's
political and social views might be relevant, and in the latter part
of this paper we will attempt to define in greater detail what those
situations might be, but in general it is our position that the
seemingly broad approach of the City Bar should be rejected.
Our reasoning is as follows:
1. Lawyers can claim an expertise only with respect to matters involving their own profession. All of us claim to be able to
appraise the legal competence of our fellow lawyers and judges.
Few of us can justly claim any particular expertise as economists or sociologists. For this reason, we have no special claim to
the confidence of the American public when we espouse views in
these fields.
2. Even if lawyers were knowledgeable in the areas of economics, sociology, and politics, it would still be inappropriate, in
our view, for the ABA to evaluate a candidate on the basis of his
economic, social and political philosophy. Economic, social, and
political philosophies are not primarily matters of fact but rather
of value. And in a democracy, value judgments concerning the
48. Id.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

nature of society should be made by the people through!, their
duly elected representatives. It, therefore, follows that if anyone
is to judge a nominee on the basis of his political, economic or
social philosophy, it should be the country's political leaders
(the President and the Senate)-not an unrepresentative private
group. For the ABA to exploit its pivotal position in order to
achieve a judiciary sympathetic with the political and economic
predilections of its members would be an abuse of power and inconsistent with democratic principles.
3. Any overt attempt by the ABA to influence the selection
of Supreme Court Justices on the basis of their political or social views would result in a loss of its influence in the judicial selection process and would, therefore, preclude the Association
from contributing in the area where it does have expertise,
namely, the evaluation of professional competence. The relationship between the ABA's influence in the judicial selection process
and its position of political neutrality has been acutely analyzed
by Grossman:
By agreement with the Attorney General, the Committee ostensibly
limits its inquiries to those factors that have a bearing on the professional qualifications of prospective candidates. It is with respect to
just such factors that the Committee claims specialized knowledge and
the 'right' to be consulted. If it were to recognizably deal with political
factors such as party affiliation and the views of the candidates on
contemporary social issues, it would almost certainly lose the coating
of legitimacy which now supports its operations. And the benefits of
its work to the Attorney General would be seriously diluted. Furthermore, any evidence of a particular political orientation influencing the
Committee's recommendations would completely destroy its usefulness
to the Attorney General, and the relationship would be shattered.
The pre-Committee history of the American Bar Association's involvement in the judicial-selection process in behalf of very conservative
interests, and the present ideological orientation of the Association,
are prejudices from which the Committee must dissociate itself. 40
One need not speculate as to the probable consequences of
the ABA's involvement in politics. The sorry history of its loss
of prestige after the political activities of its leaders in the 1930s
(supra III) proves the wisdom of its present non-political stance.
The fact that these earlier actions were not official ABA posi49.

GROSSMAN, at 125.
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tions is of no importance since they were designedly publicized
as though they were.
t 4. Basing an official position of ABA primarily upon a nominee's social or economic views is bound to be divisive and inimical
to the proper objectives of the Association. This is true, first, because the stated objectives of the ABA are to improve the administration of justice and not to forward a particular social or
economic (or, a fortiori political) viewpoint. Within the membership of the ABA (currently 144,446) 5' will be found every
shade of political, social and economic view. By the nature of the
Association, there has never been, and cannot be a delegation of
any general authority to any committee to speak on non-legal matters for the membership. If the president wishes to appoint to the
Supreme Court a lawyer who is convinced that an entirely changed
basis of taxation based on a new economic policy ought to be
adopted, it seems clear to us that this is his prerogative, and that
the ABA has no views of sufficient expertise to warrant their acceptance by the president or the public. This is not to say that
individual lawyers, or groups of lawyers not professing sponsorship
of bar associations, should not formulate and express their own
view on such a candidacy with all vigor, just as all other citizens.
A! similar expression by the ABA would lead it once more into
"the political thicket." It is our view that such an expression of
opinion would be as repugnant to the objectives of the Association
as would a poll of the membership on the national policy reflected
in the Vietnam War. (We do not refer, of course, to the unquestioned right of any bar association to express an opinion on the
legality of this or any other war.) The consequences of such illconsidered action have been serious in the past and they could certainly be disastrous if adopted again in the future.
It should also be noted that the ABA or its Committee on the
Federal Judiciary may be dominated at any particular time by a
fortuitous and temporary combination of political, economic or
social liberals or conservatives in any mix. Under such circumstances, historical consistency in such areas is impossible to
achieve.
At this point, we would like to emphasize that vigorous criticism of the philosophy and the related views of any aspirant for
50. As of June 30, 1970. The information was secured from the American Bar
Association on August 18, 1970.
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judicial office is always the prerogative and sometimes the duty of
the individual lawyer. Groups of like-thinking lawyers may properly be organized for similar purposes providing they reveal the
true basis of their association. The effectiveness of the group of
individual lawyers which was formed to oppose the confirmation
of Judge Carswell should dispel any fear that action taken outside
the organized bar will inevitably be futile." And since effective
alternative means of expressing opinion concerning the confirmation of Supreme Court justices exist for concerned lawyers, there
seems to us little reason for bar associations to take stands on such
appointments which are based on the ideological or political beliefs
of the candidate.
C.

The PresentPositionof the American Bar AssociationAdvice Confined to ProfessionalQualifications

Much of the justification for the new arrangement between
the Attorney General and the American Bar Association has already been stated. If we accept the premise that it is better to secure
the advice of lawyers with respect at least to the professional qualifications of judges, we are necessarily drawn to the further conclusion that the ABA Committee's procedure is the only available
means of obtaining such advice at the present time. We should then
consider whether the new official robe which has been draped
about the ABA's shoulders will itself tend to produce a better
product. If all we can expect is a recurrence in the future of the
sequence of events in the review by the ABA of the Haynsworth
and Carswell candidacies (where both were found unfit by the
Senate despite a finding of qualification by the ABA Committee
after a full review of the record), we may well consider dubious the
characterization by Chairman Walsh of the new arrangement as
"the most important innovation in the procedure for selecting Supreme Court nominees ... . Doubters may well think such an
observation more reminiscent of Samuel Johnson's characteriza51. As stated above, the authors disapprove of ad-hoc groups (such as the group
formed to oppose the confirmation of Judge Carswell) trying to claim the prestige of
bar associations by identifying the offices which their members or signatories hold or
have held in the different bar associations. However, we believe that the anti-Carswell
group would have been almost as effective had it not so designated its signatories.
52. Letter from Lawrence E. Walsh to John N. Mitchell, July 27, 1970.
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tion of an early remarriage
of one of his friends as "the triumph of
3
hope over experience." 5
So far as we are aware, there has never been an official attempt
to define the three elements of "professional qualifications" to
which the ABA has limited itself. At a later point we suggest what
we consider appropriate and necessary definitions which ought to
be adopted and publicized by the ABA. In addition, we attempt to
show that there are certain instances, even under the ABA's test,
where political and ideological factors should be deemed relevant
in the evaluation of a nominee and we further attempt to establish
some guidelines for determining when these factors should be considered.
Before doing this we wish to record our preference for the
ABA test, even without the clarification and expansion which we
consider necessary and express the view that the new arrangement
will in fact function more effectively than the old. Our reasons for
preferring the ABA position have been set forth in detail in our
consideration of the City Bar position. Our reasons for predicting
that the new process will be more effective are as follows:
1. In practice, as well as in theory, the same basic system has
worked well when applied to the selection of judges of other federal courts where it has official recognition and adequate time for
investigation. In its new guise it may repeat some of its successes at
the Supreme Court level. Those lawyers who have participated in
the intercontinental telethon that constitutes a major feature of
the present system of assembling the views of the ABA on nominees for the district courts and the courts of appeals know that the
system has permitted the administration to avoid many mistakes.
We believe that a consensus of lawyers active in the courts of the
United States would conclude that the caliber of the federal court
judges, appointed by the President, has on the whole been higher
than that of state court judges chosen by popular election. Some
part of the credit for this must go to the work of the ABA's Committee on the Federal Judiciary. Again, its proposed role in an inquiry about "professional qualification," specifically including the
questions of "integrity" and "judicial temperament" has proved
broad enough in the past to invite information about almost any
aspect of the nominee's career. As a result, it is a happy fact that
53. 2 J. BOSWEiLL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 128 (1770), taken from L. F. Powell's revision of
G. B. Hill's edition.
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many persons who might now be serving on the federal bench
have instead found themselves continuing otherwise undistinguished professional or legislative careers.
2. The new categories of classification set forth in Judge
Walsh's letter to President Segal is also a marked improvement
over earlier procedures. Thus, persons considered for the Supreme
Court will be rated as meeting "high standards of integrity, judicial
temperament and professional competence;" or "not opposed;" or
"not qualified." Judge Walsh adds hopefully: "It will make clear
that although a minimally qualified person is not opposed he is
not endorsed."5 4 If these hopes come to fruition, they will eliminate a chief cause of complaint against the earlier system, where a
rating of "qualified" (no longer to be used) was urged by the
nominee's supporters and misunderstood by the public as equivalent to an ABA endorsement. Under the new system, the rating
"not opposed" will logically compel the inference that the nominee is considered to lack "high standards of integrity, judicial
temperament and professional competence"-in other words, a virtual damnation with the faintest possible praise.
3. The presumed abolition of the "24-hour period" for in-

vestigation has advantages almost too obvious to mention. Such
abolition was apparently accomplished sub silentio, since the subject was not mentioned in the exchange of correspondence between
Attorney General Mitchell and Judge Walsh. However, the report
of the Committee on the Federal Judiciary, which generated the
exchange, complains specifically of the "limited period" for investigation, 5 and Judge Walsh's letter of acceptance speaks of a
preliminary informal investigation and report prior to "undertaking broader inquiries." 6 It thus seems clear that one of the new
rules of the game will be the allowance of adequate time for investigation and, what is almost as desirable as investigation, informal discussion between the Committee and the Department of
Justice.
4. Finally, the issuance of an official commission to the Committee by the Attorney General is perhaps the most important
advantage of the new procedure. Heretofore the Committee has
occupied the nervous status of the wallflower at the ball-eager to
54. Letter from Lawrence E. Walsh to Bernard G. Segal, May 13, 1970.
55. Report of the ABA Committee on FederalJudiciary, at 4.
56. Letter from Lawrence E. Walsh to John N. Mitchell, July 27, 1970.
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dance but seldom invited. In all walks of life, responsibility begets
performance, and we confidently predict the development by the
Committee of higher standards, more intensive investigation procedures, and ultimately a far more effective role in the selection of
candidates for the high court. Contributing to this progression, of
course, will be the increased public scrutiny which will now attend
the Committee's deliberations and reports.
V.

SLICING THE GORDIAN KNOT

The bare bones of the dilemma which we have outlined may
be summarized thus:
1. An appraisal of a nominee's political (in the broadest
sense), philosophic, economic and social views is a legitimate and
essential activity for the public, including lawyers and groups of
lawyers organized for that purpose.
2. In some cases, but by no means all, such views are relevant
to and may in a particular case even be decisive of a finding with
respect to a nominee's professional qualifications.
3. Lawyers can claim no special expertise in appraising political, social and economic views, beyond that of the general public,
unless such views are properly found relevant in a particular
case to the question of professional qualifications. In our judgment,
the City Bar errs in assuming an expertise for the ABA Committee
in all such questions, regardless of their relevance to the matter of
professional qualifications.
We prefer the ABA approach though we believe it to be inadequate in failing to define exactly when and for what purpose a
nominee's views on such subjects may be considered to infringe
upon his professional qualifications and thus a proper subject for
consideration.
Is there a better way? We believe there is, and with some
trepidation now propose it.
As a first step we think it necessary to attempt to define the
proper meaning of professional qualifications which we think
ought to be publicly adopted by the ABA as guidelines for the
Committee.
Of the tripod of qualifications listed but not so far further defined by the ABA or the Committee, we consider first the meaning
of "professional competence." We think this comprehends at least
85

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

two qualities: (1) a basic understanding of our constitutional and
legal system and the way in which that system permits and encourages social progress in an orderly and peaceful manner in
accordance with the will of the majority of voters; (2) a background knowledge of substantive and procedural legal principles,
sufficient to permit the application of legal and practical reason to
the solution of the complex and unique problems, many in unfamiliar areas, which must be passed upon by the Supreme Court.
As to "integrity" we suggest that the meaning of this term
ought not to be confined to an absence of dishonesty or the assurance of incorruptibility in the conventional sense. Rather, it should
clearly encompass intellectual integrity, i.e., a passion for justice
-and a willingness to follow the dictates of a judge's reasoning power
in the decision of cases without regard to the popularity or general
acceptability of the conclusion to which he is led. The greatest
judges have this quality and this is one reason why predicting
judicial performance in advance is so difficult. The listing of Supreme Court Justices is replete with examples of supposedly conservative advocates winding up as liberal justices, and vice versa;
this, we believe, primarily because their integrity so dictated.
"Judicial temperament" is a more elusive concept. The words
mean simply that a man's demonstrated mental and moral qualities, together with a habit of self discipline, lead us to believe that
he will in fact act as we all believe judges should act; that he will
be firm, but not overbearing; courteous and patient; unprejudiced
or at least aware of his prejudices and determined to eliminate
them as decisional factors; that he should not only do justice, but
should give the appearance of doing justice.
It is both interesting and significant that the Committee conceived of cases where "political and ideological factors" would have
to be considered when they "might affect judicial temperament."
Among other things, this is a somewhat reluctant concession that
philosophical and social views must occasionally be taken into account at least for limited purposes. In our view this is a rather
disingenuous approach since it involves a distortion of the ordinary
concept of "judicial temperament." Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the saving clause may prove a useful escape hatch in the
future.
It might be pertinent to inquire what the recommendation of
the ABA would have been had the 1948 racist remarks of Candi86
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date Carswell been repeated by Judge Carswell in 1968.T Suppose, too, that his activities in incorporating the "all-white" club
in 1958 had been known to the Committee. 8 We have no doubt
that under such circumstances the Committee would have bravely
stretched the meaning of the term "judicial temperament" and
would have held the nominee disqualified.
We consider such an approach to be lacking in essential candor. Instead, we would prefer a test which would openly recognize
that political and ideological factors might be relevant and which
would give some guidance as to the occasions on which such factors
should and should not be considered. The test which we propose is
as follows: The ABA should consider those beliefs of the nominee
(whether they be denominated political, social, or economic be-Iiefs) which bear rpon the nominee's commitment to those basic
values which are implicit in the concept of the rule of law. Judges
and lawyers in our society (and in every society) operate within a
context of a legal system which has its own implicit values. For
example, the ideal of equality before the law regardless of economic, racial or social status, a belief that change should be effected through orderly processes, and the belief that truth is most
likely to emerge when each side is given a fair opportunity to present its position are among the basic assumptions of our system.
Indeed, these values are so basic in our system of jurisprudence,
that one who lacks a strong and vigorous commitment to them is
not likely to perform his role either as a judge or a lawyer satisfactorily. Note that one's commitment to these values constitutes
in the most fundamental sense a political viewpoint-a view as to
how society should be structured and operated. Notwithstanding
the authors' position that the ABA ought to generally abstain from
considering a nominee's political and social views, they do believe
that the ABA should consider the nominee's commitment to these
basic values. In this context, the very factors which militate against
ABA consideration of a nominee's political and social views in the
normal case argue for an examination of his commitment to these
values.
First, the ABA as representative of the nation's lawyers can
claim, if not an expertise, at least a developed sensitivity to the
57. 1948 campaign speech by Carswell, printed in 116 CONG. RFc. 35939-40 (dailv PA.
Mar. 18, 1970).
58. Letter of Bruce Bromley, Francis T. P. Plimpton 5amuel I. Rosenmax isethuel
M. Webster, et al., printed in 116 CONG. REc. 1607 (daily ea MIar. 4, 1970).
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importance of these values in our national life. By education, training, experience and daily practice, the lawyer is made acutely aware
of the importance of such values. The ordinary citizen only rarely
has occasion to reflect upon the importance of fair procedures in the
resolution of disputes. Yet almost every lawyer, whether he be a
trial lawyer trying a case before a jury, an administrative lawyer
representing his client before the Federal Trade Commission, or
a tax lawyer seeking a favorable ruling from the Internal Revenue
Service, is impressed constantly with the importance of having an
impartial tribunal willing to listen to every side with an open mind
and a willingness to judge the issues involved objectively without
regard to its personal views. Because of his focal role in the peaceful resolution of disputes, the lawyer is uniquely aware of the importance of such values and becomes to a large extent society's
guardian of these values.
Secondly, the danger of divisiveness which is a serious concern
where the ABA attempts to pass upon a nominee on the basis of his
social and political views (in the conventional sense) is substantially less where it judges a nominee on the basis of his commitments to the fundamental values which are implicit in the rule of
law. Indeed, because these values are so commonly shared by the
members of the legal profession, a judgment on a nominee which
is grounded on such considerations may serve as a reaffirmation of
the Bar's ultimate ideals and hence may serve to unify and consolidate the members of the organization. On the other hand, it must
be recognized that the application of such broad principles in a
specific factual context may be highly controversial and may appear to be a guise under which a candidate is actually reviewed on
the basis of his political and social views. Nevertheless, to the extent that the ABA can convincingly demonstrate that its decision
was made on the basis of the nominee's commitment to the values
of the legal system, the decision should unify rather than divide
the profession.
Finally, the danger that the ABA will lose its favored position
in the appointment and confirmatory process (and hence its ability
to influence that process in the area where it has greatest claim to
special expertise, namely, the question of professional competence)
will be substantially less where it bases its decisions on the
nominee's commitment to the legal process than where it bases the
decision on the nominee's political and social views (in the con88
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ventional sense). Application of the criterion suggested by the
auth Siwould be politically neutral, that is, there is no reason to
suppose a priori that it will favor Republican over Democratic
nominees (or vice versa), or liberals over conservatives (or vice
versa). Accordingly, the danger that the ABA will be viewed as a
political partisan will be relatively slight. Moreover, the public
probably does recognize the Bar's special concern with these values
and hence will tolerate a judgment which is grounded upon such
considerations. Of course, as stated above, there is a danger that
the application of such general criteria to a specific factual situation may be subject to bitter dispute and may be viewed by some
as a guise under which a candidate is in fact illegitimately judged
on the basis of his economic, social and political philosophy. Because of this danger, the authors recommend that if a candidate
is to be disapproved because of a lack of commitment to the basic
values of the legal system (rather than because of his lack of
technical competence), the reason for his disapproval should be
set forth explicitly in a written report which details the nominee's
alleged lack of commitment. A candid recognition by the ABA of
the quasi-political nature of its decision should go a long way towards dispelling the fear that the organization is abusing its position by making its decision under the cover of objective criteria on
the basis of its own political and economic predelictions. Furthermore, because political factors are legitimately considered by the
President and the Senate in the appointment and confirmatory
process, a report detailing the quasi-political nature of the Bar
Association's recommendation will enable the political leaders to
properly evaluate the deference which it should be given.
A few examples may explain what the authors have in mind
by the phrase "commitment to the basic values implicit in the rule
of law." A lawyer whose professional career has been marked by
repeated attempts to disrupt trials of his client should be disapproved by the ABA for appointment to the Supreme Court since
his actions evince a lack of commitment to the concept of resolving
disputes in accordance with the orderly process of the law. A nominee who has advocated widespread violence as a means of achieving certain political and social objectives should likewise be
rejected because of his lack of commitment to the rule of law. And
if the ABA found that Judge Carswell displayed a bias and hostility
towards black litigants and black lawyers on the basis of their
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race, as was alleged, it should have disapproved him because such
actions would have reflected a rejection of the ideal of equality before the law regardless of race, creed or economic status.
It need hardly be added that we by no means would disqualify
a nominee who has reasoned convictions as to the need for change
in many aspects of our constitutional, legal and judicial system.
For example, reasonable men differ today on whether recent decisions of the Supreme Court give too much protection to persons
accused of crime as opposed to the needs of society, and no such
opinion should act as a disqualification. Again, we would not suppose that a nominee should be disqualified because he believes that
all qualifications of every kind on the right to vote, including
literacy and language tests, ought to be abolished.
What we have attempted to describe is a commitment to principles so basic to the operation of a judicial system that it is difficult to imagine a judge performing his duties properly without
their guidance. No political, social or economic views which do not
affect that ability ought to be considered.
This brings us to the final and most difficult part of our task
-to formulate such a standard for the guidance of the ABA and its
Committee on the Federal Judiciary. We suggest the following:
The responsibility of the Committee is to express its opinion
on the professional qualifications of the nominee for service on the
Supreme Court. In formulating such opinion, the Committee
should seek information and take into account the following factors:
1. Integrity.
2. Judicial temperament.
3. Professional competence.
4. The nominee's record, public and private, as indicating his
qualifications, or lack of qualifications, for high judicial office. In
weighing this factor, the Committee should consider the whole
career of the nominee, including expressions of his views with respect to the American judicial system, the rule of law and the rights
of man. It should then reach a determination, if possible, as to
whether anything known about the nominee casts substantial
doubt on his ability to follow the rule of law and to render justice
without regard to a litigant's race, color, ethnic background or
economic status.
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We think that only a brief explanation and justification is required for our proposal. In our view, philosophical and social
(hardly ever economic) views of a nominee become relevant to an
ABA inquiry only if of a kind and held with such determination
that they become informative as to his probable performance as a
judge. The ABA believes that such a test may be correctly viewed
as a method of determining his "judicial temperament." We prefer
to phrase the test in terms of the probable effect of such views on
the specific performance of his most important judicial responsibility. We consider such an inquiry as more relevant in establishing what we earlier described as a judge's intellectual integrity-his
basic commitment to doing justice among men.
In the hope that this proposal, intended as a more precise
formulation of the weight to be given certain views of nominees
for the Supreme Court, may contribute something to the current
debate on this vital subject, we submit these views to the profession for its consideration.

